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Privacy and Public Health in the Information Age: 
Electronic Health Records and the Minnesota 
Health Records Act 
Kari Bomash* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2004 President George W. Bush announced a new 
federal initiative to develop electronic health records (“EHR”) 
for every American by 2014 because of their tremendous 
promise to reduce medical errors, reduce administrative costs 
in the health care system, and improve public health research.1  
In response to President Bush’s announcement, Minnesota 
Governor Tim Pawlenty, in 2005, supported a statewide 
mandate that every health care provider in Minnesota would 
have EHRs by 2015.2  One of the first pieces of legislation 
Minnesota passed to meet the 2015 mandate was the 
Minnesota Health Records Act (“MHRA”), which was hailed as 
creating an “electronic superhighway for medical records.”3 
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 1. See, e.g., Laura Dunlop, Electronic Health Records: Interoperability 
Challenges Patients’ Right to Privacy, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 16, 16 
(2007). 
 2. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.495 (West. Supp. 2008); MINN. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH, FINAL REPORT ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY BARRIERS TO, AND 
SOLUTIONS FOR, THE ELECTRONIC EXCHANGE OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
(2007), available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-
health/mpsp/solutionsrpt.pdf [hereinafter Solutions Report]; Summary of 2007 
HHS Omnibus Bill, http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/opa/07legsumm.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2008). 
 3. Lorna Benson, Network Will Link Patient Records, MINN. PUB. RADIO, 
Sept. 10, 2007, available at 
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/09/10/healthrecords; see 
also MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTH, FROM VISION TO ACTION: THE MINNESOTA E-
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The MHRA re-codified existing state law regarding the 
disclosure of medical records and added three new features 
which were developed in an attempt to remove patient consent-
related barriers from the development and implementation of 
EHRs.4  Those features are: (1) Record Locator Services 
(“RLS”)—electronic indexes stating the physical location of a 
patient’s records; (2) “representation of consent,” which allows 
a disclosing provider to accept a requesting provider’s 
statement that there is valid consent for record disclosure in 
lieu of a signed consent form from the patient; and (3) liability 
for illegal disclosure for a “bad actor.”5  Privacy advocates, 
echoing the concerns of some media and scholars, argued before 
the Minnesota State Legislature that the MHRA weakens 
patient privacy protections for medical records by encouraging 
EHR development.6 
This article analyzes whether the MHRA adequately 
protects patient privacy while moving Minnesota toward its 
2015 goal.  First, the article explores the importance of patient 
privacy protection as a public health policy in the context of 
EHRs.  Second, it briefly outlines the legal landscape of EHR 
privacy regulation.  Third, the article considers whether the 
previous Minnesota medical records disclosure law was a 
barrier to EHR implementation.  Fourth, it examines whether 
public health needs were adequately considered in the MHRA 
and whether the law balances individual privacy with EHR 
development.  Finally, the article considers whether and how 
the MHRA should be amended to better meet public health 
privacy goals. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND PATIENT CONSENT OF 
                                                          
HEALTH INITIATIVE (2008), available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-
health/legrpt2008.pdf [hereinafter E-Health Initiative]. 
 4. Minnesota Health Records Act of 2007: Hearing on H.F. 1726 Before H. 
Comm. on Public Safety and Civil Justice, 85th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2007) 
(statement of Jim Golden), available at 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/archivescomm.asp?comm=6000&ls_ye
ar=85) [hereinafter Mar. 21, 2007 hearing]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Minnesota Health Records Act of 2007: Hearing on S.F. 1701 
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2007), available at 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/schedule/schedule.php?date=5/1/2007&type
=weekly&ls=85 [hereinafter May 1, 2007 hearing]. 
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RECORD DISCLOSURE 
Electronic medical records (EMRs) generally refer to any 
medical record or part of a medical record that is kept in an 
electronic format.7  Thus, an EMR could include any or all of 
the following: lab results, x-rays, prescriptions, physicians’ 
notes, or research on a specific patient.8  An EHR is an 
interoperable EMR.  Currently, most EMRs are not 
interoperable, even if networks have purchased EMR 
technology from the same vendor.9  Interoperable EMR 
technology has not thus far developed because: (1) there are no 
agreed-upon data standards for interoperability; (2) there is not 
a consistent incentive scheme to encourage interoperable 
development; and (3) there are increasing technological 
differences between EMR databases as vendors build more 
specialized systems for different health care networks.10 
At present, patient privacy protection of medical records is 
controlled mostly by patient consent laws that define how and 
when a patient must consent before a physician may disclose 
the patient’s medical records to anyone else.11  Consent is a 
concept that works relatively well to protect paper records 
because of the physical size of medical records, and the fact 
that most are stored piecemeal at multiple medical facilities.12  
The difficulty of mining paper records for information limits the 
                                                          
 7. Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and 
Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 700–07 
(2007)(“There are great advantages to using electronic medical records more 
extensively, both within the offices of individual providers, where they are 
known as electronic medical records (EMRs), and also when such records are 
linked across multiple providers, in which case they are known as electronic 
health records (EHRs).”); see generally Elisabeth Belmont & Adele A. Waller, 
The Role of Information Technology in Reducing Medical Errors, 36 J. HEALTH 
L. 615, 616 (2003); Brent James, E-Health: Steps On The Road to 
Interoperability, HEALTH AFFS. , Jan. 19, 2005, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.26/DC1. 
 8. See generally Belmont & Waller, supra note 7. 
 9. Id. at 617–618. 
 10. Peter Pharow & Bernd Blobel, Specific Interoperability Problems of 
Security Infrastructure Services, in 3 MED. & CARE COMPUNETICS 349, 360–61 
(L. Bos et. al eds. 2006); Robert Malone, Note, Health Information Technology: 
Transforming the Healthcare Industry for the 21st Century, 3 OKLA. J. L. & 
TECH. 36, 3 (2007). 
 11. Alicia Ouellette & Jacob Reider, Practical, State, and Federal Limits 
on the Scope of Compelled Disclosure of Health Records, 7 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 
46, 46–47 (2007). 
 12. Id. 
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utility and consequences of theft.13  In an interoperable system 
where these organizational issues no longer exist, patient 
consent may be only one piece of a broader scheme of privacy 
regulation designed to more adequately protect the patient 
from foreseen and unforeseen uses of patient data.14 
B. PATIENT PRIVACY PROTECTION AS A PUBLIC HEALTH AIM 
The creation of an EHR network that allows researchers to 
access de-identified population-level data would aid public 
health in all three of its core functions: assessment, assurance, 
and policy promotion.  Privacy protection is integral to ensuring 
that high-quality data are collected by such a network.  
Therefore, patient privacy is a legitimate public health aim.  
Moreover, security breaches of EHRs could have broad social 
consequences which justify government regulation to protect 
patient privacy. 
An interoperable system that allows public health 
researchers to access de-identified population level data would 
allow for better and faster assessment of diseases that strike 
the general population and sub-populations.15  It would also 
allow for non-industry assessment of competing treatments and 
faster development of evidence-based physician treatment 
guidelines.16 
An EHR network can help assure good population health 
by allowing the Centers for Disease Control or local health 
departments to track disease outbreaks in near real time.17  
This development may reduce the time it takes to stop the 
spread of the disease, and thus improve assurance that the 
disease can be contained.18  An EHR network also has public 
health benefits for emergency and disaster planning.19  It 
would allow relocated patients to access complete medical 
records, regardless of the physical state of their physician’s 
                                                          
 13. Cf. Terry & Francis, supra note 7, at 700–07. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Roger S. Magnusson, The Changing Legal and Conceptual Shape of 
Health Care Privacy, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 680, 685–87 (2004). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 686. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Robert Malone, Note, Health Information Technology, E-Prescribing 
and Hurricane Katrina: Could Electronic Health Records Have Made A 
Difference?, 3 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 38, 9 (2007). 
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office, and thus minimize any interruption of care that might 
result from a disaster.20  Therefore, EHRs would lessen the 
negative health impacts due to relocation.  Finally, an EHR 
system can help improve the daily care that a patient receives 
because it can be designed to prospectively check prescription 
drug interactions and to facilitate the execution of treatment 
guidelines so that patients will receive the most appropriate, 
evidence-based care.21 
An EHR network would aid in policy promotion because it 
could provide more accurate data regarding the incidence and 
prevalence of disease, the effectiveness of alternative 
treatments for those diseases, and the treatment costs.22  Such 
information will help health agencies prioritize health agendas, 
advocate for funding and research, and plan cost-effective 
interventions that improve the public’s health. 
Promoting and protecting the privacy of patient medical 
records is vital to maintaining a functioning public health 
system.23  Two renowned scholars in public health and law, 
Lawrence Gostin and James G. Hodge, have developed the 
theory that there is a synergistic relationship between privacy 
protection and public health benefits deriving from shared 
information.24 They argue that successful information 
technology for public health depends upon strong privacy 
protection because public health entities (usually 
governmental) cannot function without the support and trust of 
individuals.25  To maintain that trust, individuals must believe 
that public health agencies will not misuse or abuse health 
                                                          
 20. Id. at 6–7. 
 21. See June M. Sullivan, Recent Developments and Future Trends in 
Electronic Medical and Personal Health Records, 19 HEALTH L. 16, 16 (2007); 
Terry & Francis, supra note 7, at 692–93. 
 22. MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTH, PROTECTING COMMUNITIES THROUGH 
IMPROVED PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2007), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-health/mnphin/legrpt2007.pdf [hereinafter 
Information Systems Report]. 
 23. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and 
Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health 
Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2002); James G. 
Hodge, Jr., Health Information Privacy and Public Health, 31 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 663, 663 (2003) [hereinafter Hodge I]; James G. Hodge, Jr., National 
Health Information Privacy and New Federalism, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 791, 791 (2000) [hereinafter Hodge II]. 
 24. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 23, at 1441–43. 
 25. Id. at 1442. 
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information and will strongly protect patient data.26  Otherwise 
patients may not wish to participate fully or they might 
withhold sensitive information which may affect the individual 
patient’s treatment and, at a population level, skew research 
results and policy proposals that result from that research.27  
In other words, in order to get accurate data that can lead to 
valid research and policy development, public health agencies 
must be able to protect the individual privacy of those records. 
The privacy of EHRs also has public health ramifications 
due to the potential scale of security breaches.  Currently, 
paper records are not very secure.28  Someone intent on 
stealing records could easily walk into most clinics and walk 
out with files.29  However, such a theft is limited to affecting 
the individuals whose records are stolen because of the physical 
size of the files and the fact that they are housed in disparate 
locations.  Further, there is not a great market for this medical 
information because of the difficulty in amassing a large 
volume of records.  Electronic records may actually be more 
secure than paper records, if for no other reason than that 
clinics would have password-protected systems to access 
them.30  It would take a higher level of skill to hack into even a 
moderately secure system than to walk into an office and steal 
paper records.  The difference is that should someone steal 
electronic records, they could potentially steal a huge number 
of them and they could steal an entire record rather than just a 
piece.31  The scope of the theft creates the possibility of 
producing markets for medical information to employers or 
insurance companies who want to reduce costs, or to medical 
companies that will mine that data for marketing health 
products, or to health care entities themselves who want to win 
patients.32  These consequences have much broader social 
implications than the theft of individual files because the data 
could then be used for private financial gain rather than for 
legitimate public health purposes. 
A full-fledged public health privacy policy should be 
                                                          
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1551–52. 
 28. See May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6; Sullivan, supra note 21, at 17. 
 29. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 17. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Magnusson, supra note 15, at 685. 
 32. Id. 
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developed because privacy protection is integral to continuing 
and developing EHR networks.  The absence of a well-designed 
policy means that there are no consequences for data misuse 
because such misuse is not prohibited.  The absence of a 
privacy policy will not prevent EHR development.  It will 
simply mean that whether and what kind of privacy protections 
are used with EHR technology will be determined by industry 
instead of by government and public health agencies. 
A review of the literature ultimately shows three key areas 
on which a public health privacy policy should focus: patient 
consent, data security standards, and data use.  The first issue 
is that of patient consent to record disclosure and how that 
process will and will not work with EHRs.33  The second issue 
is the assumption that data will not be secure.34  This 
assumption suggests that any privacy policy for EHRs must 
include data security requirements to protect data beyond a 
patient’s consent.  The third issue considers how medical 
information will be used.35  This concern suggests that public 
policy must define acceptable and unacceptable data uses; it 
must also determine consequences for data abuse in an attempt 
to minimize the creation of markets for inappropriate data use.  
The issues of consent, data standards, and information use 
should be developed simultaneously in relation to each other as 
the protections of each may change depending on the 
protections of the others.  For example, the consent process 
may change depending on the data security requirements.  
Likewise, the data security requirements might change based 
on the intended data use. 
In order to protect the privacy of records and to meet public 
health aims, government can either: (1) build a public 
infrastructure for the exchange of records and extrapolation of 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, Compelled 
Disclosure of Health Information: Protecting Against the Greatest Potential 
Threat to Privacy, 295 JAMA 2882 (2006); Terry & Francis, supra note 7; 
Kristin E. Schleiter, The Dinosaur in the Office: A Consideration of the 
Technical and Ethical Issues Surrounding the Adoption of Digital Medical 
Data and the Extinction of the Paper Record, 16 ANNALS HEALTH L. 353, 356–
57 (2007). 
 34. See, e.g., Latour Lafferty, Medical Identity Theft: The Future Threat of 
Health Care Fraud Is Now, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 11, 11 (2007); 
Magnusson, supra note 15; Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 33. 
 35. See, e.g., Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 33; Terry & Francis, supra 
note 7. 
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data that will protect individual privacy or (2) develop a 
regulatory framework of privacy and security requirements by 
which private industry may act.  These solutions differ from 
policy that promotes EHRs for individual medical benefit 
because those policies focus more on organizational-level 
privacy regulation (mostly via patient consent) and technology 
adoption.  A public health privacy policy includes patient 
consent, but also regulates the technology industry directly to 
provide technological security.  The MHRA is an indication that 
Minnesota has decided to develop regulation for private entities 
rather than to build the EHR infrastructure itself. 
C. LAYERS OF INTERLOCKING REGULATION 
Currently there is no cohesive medical data privacy policy 
in the United States.36  Instead, laws are divided between state 
and federal governments and organized by different categories 
of regulation (such as consent and data standards).37  Most of 
the discussion of privacy protection laws and health records 
focuses on whether the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) provides sufficient protection of 
patients’ medical records, or alternatively, how HIPAA has 
been or could be changed to encourage EHR networks.38  As a 
federal law, HIPAA can provide uniform rules across states for 
EHR privacy.  However, HIPAA is considered a regulatory 
“floor,” meaning that all states must at a minimum provide 
HIPAA protections of medical records, although states are free 
to provide more stringent protections.39 Therefore, state 
regulation such as Minnesota’s may have a greater impact 
upon the development of EHR technology and privacy within 
the state. In fact, many state laws require greater levels of 
protection for medical records than does HIPAA.40  As a result, 
the nationwide privacy protection of medical records is a 
patchwork of different laws and standards which in and of 
                                                          
 36. See Terry & Francis, supra note 7, at 683. 
 37. See Nancy J. Brent, The Use and Misuse of Electronic Patient Data, 28 
J. OF INFUSION NURSING 251, 252–54 (2005). 
 38. See, e.g., id.; Bridget M. Carney, Breaches of Confidentiality and the 
Electronic Community Health Record: Challenges for Healthcare 
Organizations and the Community, 13 H.E.C. FORUM 138, 138 (2001); Gostin 
& Hodge, supra note 23; Malone, supra note 10. 
 39. Brent, supra note 37; Carney, supra note 38; Gostin & Hodge, supra 
note 23; Malone, supra note 10, at 4. 
 40. Terry & Francis, supra, note 7, at 707. 
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itself challenges the creation of and participation in a national 
EHR network. 
1. Minnesota’s Data Security Standards 
Health data standards have been considered as part of 
Minnesota’s overall privacy protection scheme.41  Recently the 
Minnesota Department of Health (“MDH”), the agency that 
coordinates EHR development and regulation, stated that it 
has enacted interoperability data standards.42  There are data 
standards for a few special areas such as e-prescribing.43  
However, broad security standards applicable to all portions of 
an EHR have yet to be developed.  One committee has 
recommended that Minnesota adopt federal recommendations 
when such recommendations are made.44  The federal 
government may ultimately make an interoperability data 
standards recommendation through various private EHR 
technology licensing entities such as the Certification 
Commission for Health Information Technology (“CCHIT”) and 
the Health Information Technology Standards Panel (“HITSP”).  
However, the federal office in charge of EHR development, the 
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology, essentially coordinates regional efforts to develop 
EHR technology.45  Consequently, the cautious 
recommendation to wait for federal guidance does not 
significantly move the state towards developing data security 
standards for EHRs. 
2. Consent: The Minnesota Health Records Act 
The MHRA re-codified and modified pre-existing 
Minnesota patient consent laws for the disclosure of medical 
records in three key areas: (1) defining and regulating an RLS; 
(2) developing the concept of a representation of consent; and 
(3) shifting liability to a “bad actor” in the case of an unlawful 
                                                          
 41. See, e.g., E-Health Initiative, supra note 3. 
 42. Id. at 6–7. 
 43. See MINN. STAT. § 152.126 (Supp. 2007). 
 44. See E-Health Initiative, supra note 4. The E-Health Committee is 
comprised of various EHR stakeholders that recommends policies and laws to 
the legislature to aid in EHR development and implementation. 
 45. U.S. Dept. of Health and Hum. Servs., Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology: Mission, 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/onc/mission (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). 
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disclosure.46  The legislative history shows that the Minnesota 
State Legislature intended that the MHRA would encourage 
EHR development while protecting patient privacy.47  It also 
shows that the legislature failed to consider broader EHR and 
privacy policies when developing the MHRA.48  In fact, of the 
factors identified above (patient consent, data security 
standards, and data use), the MHRA and preceding debates 
focused only on the specific patient consent process.49 
i. The Record Locator Service 
The MHRA authorizes the development of RLSs, which in 
essence are indices of the physical locations of the patients’ 
records.50  An RLS is owned by a Health Information Exchange 
(“HIE”) which is a legal arrangement between various health 
care entities (including payors) that have agreed to share 
information.51  Any member of the HIE with information about 
patients can enter non-clinical identifying information about 
the patient into the RLS without the patient’s consent.52  Thus, 
a payor, the MDH, or provider with records about a patient can 
enter enough information to uniquely identify the patient 
(name, date of birth, parents’ names, etc.) and can indicate that 
they have records for that patient.  The RLS does not contain 
the actual patient records; it only indicates where the patient’s 
records can be found.53 
Only providers may access the RLS to get a record’s 
                                                          
 46. See MINN. STAT. §§ 144.291, 144.293, subdiv. 2, 144.298 (Supp. 2007). 
 47. See, e.g., Minnesota Health Records Act of 2007: Hearing on H.F. 1726 
Before the H. Comm. On Health and Human Services, 85th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 
2007), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/ls85/healthpol031307.asx 
[hereinafter Mar. 13, 2007 hearing]; Minnesota Health Records Act of 2007: 
Hearing on H.F. 1726 Before the H. Comm. On Health and Human Services, 
85th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2007), 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/ls85/healthpol031507.asx [hereinafter 
Mar. 15, 2007 hearing]. 
 48. Mar. 13, 2007 hearing, supra note 47; Mar. 15, 2007 hearing, supra 
note 47. 
 49. Mar. 13, 2007 hearing, supra note 47; Mar. 15, 2007 hearing, supra 
note 47. 
 50. MINN. STAT. §§ 144.293, subdiv. 8(a), 144.291, subdiv. 2(i) (Supp. 
2007). 
 51. Id. § 144.291, subdiv. 2(b). 
 52. Id. § 144.293, subdiv. 8(a). 
 53. Id. § 144.291, subdiv. 2(i). 
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location.54 Providers must have a patient’s consent to access the 
information in the RLS.55  Further, the patient has the right to 
completely opt-out of the RLS.56  This right can be exercised 
when the physician is attempting to get consent to access the 
RLS.57  The physician will educate the patient about the RLS 
and the consent form will have an option to remove the patient 
and any patient information from the index.58  However, the 
patient cannot select which specific records he or she wants in 
or out of the RLS so the provider will see all RLS entries.  The 
RLS has liability for improper disclosure of information from 
the RLS.59 
The MHRA intentionally does not require the creation of 
one statewide RLS but rather allows as many RLSs as there 
are HIEs that want to create them.60  In other words, Hospital 
A and Hospital B could decide to enter into an HIE and create 
their own RLS.  Other entities like Payer C and Clinic D could 
create another RLS.  In order to deal with multiple patient 
indices, either providers will need to access multiple RLSs, or a 
separate RLS that indexes the various indices will be needed. 
ii. Representation of Consent 
The concept of representation of consent is new to the 
MHRA.  During the legislative hearings for this statute, both 
the MDH, promoting the law, and the privacy advocates 
opposing it, looked to Black’s Law Dictionary to define a 
“representation.”61  The first definition is: “A presentation of 
fact—either by words or conduct—made to induce someone to 
act . . . .”62  In the context of the MHRA, a representation of 
consent allows a physician to obtain consent to access records 
from a patient and then to simply tell the disclosing provider 
that the requesting provider has a valid consent.63  This 
concept was developed for two reasons: first, to allow 
                                                          
 54. Id. § 144.293, subdiv. 8(a). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. § 144.293, subdiv. 8(d). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Mar. 15, 2007 hearing, supra note 47. 
 59. MINN. STAT. § 144.298, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2007). 
 60. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6. 
 61. Id. 
 62. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (8th ed. 2004). 
 63. MINN. STAT. § 144.293, subdivs. 2(3)–3 (Supp. 2007). 
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requesting physicians to skip the prior process of faxing 
consent forms back and forth and, second, to allow requesting 
physicians to electronically indicate that they have consent so 
that they can receive the records immediately via an electronic 
system.64 
Representation is not an obvious solution to either of the 
problems noted above.  A statutorily adopted universal consent 
form can resolve the first need.65  Minnesota now requires the 
MDH consent form to be accepted as valid consent by all 
providers.66  Consequently, the disclosing provider no longer 
needs to spend time inspecting consent forms for validity.  The 
second problem could be dealt with through an electronic 
consent process that transmits the actual consent form to the 
disclosing computer system (once such a system is 
implemented), as discussed below. 
iii. Shared Liability 
The MHRA changes the assignment of liability from the 
prior law, which placed all responsibility for improper 
disclosure of records on the disclosing physician.67  The MDH 
argued that the original liability risk was so large that it 
created fear of accepting consent forms from another provider 
and slowed down the exchange of records.68  Therefore, liability 
risk has been shifted to whomever the “bad actor” is (the 
requesting provider, disclosing provider, or the RLS), instead of 
solely the disclosing physician.69  Furthermore, the new 
liability policy complements representation of disclosure by 
encouraging disclosing physicians to trust that the requesting 
physicians are truthfully representing that they have valid, 
signed consent forms.  If the disclosing physician discloses, and 
the requesting physician lies about having consent, then the 
requesting physician is liable for the disclosure.70 
                                                          
 64. Mar. 15, 2007 hearing, supra note 47. 
 65. MINN. STAT. § 144.292, subdiv. 8 (Supp. 2007). See Minn. Dept. of 
Health, Minnesota Standard Consent Form to Release Health Information, 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/hpsc/dap/consent.pdf for the consent form. 
 66. See MINN. STAT. § 144.292, subdiv. 8 (Supp. 2007) (“A form developed 
by the commissioner must be accepted by a provider as a legally enforceable 
request under this section.”). 
 67. MINN. STAT. § 144.335, subdiv. 3a(h) (2006). 
 68. Mar. 13, 2007 hearing, supra note 47. 
 69. MINN. STAT. § 144.298 (Supp. 2007). 
 70. MINN. STAT. § 144.298, subdiv. 2 (Supp. 2007). 
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This liability shift may be unnecessary because there is 
now a universal consent form.  With the universal consent 
form, all disclosing providers need to do is to verify that the 
form appears to be the universal consent form in order to 
protect themselves from liability as a result of negligence. 
III. ANALYSIS: THE MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS ACT 
AS A PUBLIC HEALTH PRIVACY POLICY 
The public health community should promote a patient 
privacy policy for medical records as part of EHR development.  
Such a policy should include provisions for patient consent, 
data security standards, and information use regardless of 
whether the government chooses to build the EHR 
infrastructure itself or develop a regulatory framework through 
which private entities act.  This section examines the specific 
provisions of the MHRA and their relation to patient privacy 
protection.  It also analyzes the MHRA as a piece of a larger 
public health privacy policy. 
A. THE PREVIOUS MINNESOTA MEDICAL RECORDS DISCLOSURE 
LAW WAS A PERCEIVED BARRIER TO IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 
There are two questions central to whether the previous 
consent law was an impediment to the development of EHRs: 
first, was there the perception that the law was an impediment, 
and, second, was the law actually an impediment? 
Under the prior Minnesota consent law, consent to disclose 
medical records generally expired after one year.71  However, 
there was an exception to the expiration for disclosure to 
providers who were being consulted in conjunction with current 
treatment.72  “Current treatment” was an undefined term, 
which gave rise to two competing interpretations of the law.73  
The first interpretation was that a patient had to consent to the 
release of medical records, but once that consent was made, 
                                                          
 71. MINN. STAT. § 144.335, subdiv. 3a(a) (2006). 
 72. Id. § 144.335, subdiv. 3a(c)(1). 
 73. See Solutions Report, supra note 2, at 25 (“Some Legal Work Group 
members argue that as long as the health information exchange is only for 
patient treatment, then the patient’s consent can be fit into this exception.  
However, other Legal Work Group members argue that, under their 
interpretation, of ‘current treatment’ the consent for the RLS would expire in 
one year.”). 
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medical records could be released to the requesting provider so 
long as she was currently treating the patient.  That means 
that if Patient X signed the consent form eighteen months prior 
to coming in with a new problem, the physician could request 
medical records without a new consent form because she was 
currently treating the patient.  The second interpretation was 
that the patient must sign a new consent for release of medical 
records every time the patient was seeking new treatment from 
a provider.  Under that interpretation, the patient consent for 
release of records was valid for the treatment sought at the 
time of initial diagnosis, but if the patient returned eighteen 
months later with a new issue, a new consent for the release of 
records was needed.74  The second interpretation is much more 
restrictive of the release of medical records than the first.  The 
MDH asserted that the differences in interpretations created 
“irreconcilable differences” between providers regarding proper 
consent processes.75  The MDH does not appear to have 
conducted a study or survey but, instead, relied on the 
committee opinions that this confusion existed.76  Nevertheless, 
it was likely necessary to amend the previous consent law to 
clarify the process in order to alleviate confusion among 
providers. 
To fully answer the second question—whether the previous 
consent law actually impeded the development of EHRs—one 
must understand the prior consent process, the MDH vision for 
the MHRA consent process, and the consent process as it works 
today.  The MDH explained the prior consent process to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.77  Under the more restrictive 
interpretation of the prior law, Doctor A determines that 
Patient X has medical records at another facility from Patient 
X’s statements at Patient X’s initial appointment.  Patient X 
signs a consent form for the release of those records.  Doctor A 
faxes the signed consent form to the facility with the records.  
That facility then inspects the signed consent form to 
                                                          
 74. See id. at 27–28 (detailing the two interpretations of “current 
treatment” and the implications on patient consent requirements). 
 75. See id. at 3 (“[T]here are significant and irreconcilable differences in 
organizations’ interpretations of Minnesota’s patient consent requirements.  
These differences make it impossible for health care providers to agree on 
‘when’ and ‘how’ patient consent is required.”). 
 76. See generally id. at 5–7 (describing the background, purpose, and 
methods of the Minnesota e-Health Initiative). 
 77. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6. 
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determine whether the consent is valid under Minnesota law.  
If it is valid, the facility releases the records to Doctor A via 
messenger or mail.  If the facility finds the consent lacking, 
Doctor A drafts a new consent form that meets the disclosing 
facility’s standards and has Patient X sign it.  Ultimately, 
Patient X cannot be treated until the records are at Doctor A’s 
office.  Therefore, under this scenario, it is likely that Patient X 
will need to schedule another appointment to be treated at a 
time after the records have been received by Doctor A. 
The MDH explained its picture of how an EHR health 
system would work from the patient’s perspective.78  Doctor A 
determines, from Patient X’s statements, that Patient X has 
medical records at other facilities.  Patient X signs a consent 
form for the RLS, and Doctor A uses the RLS to find the 
physical location of Patient X’s records.  Next, Patient X signs a 
second consent form giving Doctor A permission to access the 
actual health records from the facilities holding them.  Doctor A 
checks a box in his computer that represents that he has the 
necessary consent from the patient to view the records he 
requests.  The computer communicates with the computerized 
database at the other facility (not the RLS) which makes the 
records available to Doctor A for viewing.  All of this would 
happen in real time, so that Patient X may have his records 
reviewed during the initial appointment.79 
Comparing these consent processes, EHR benefits to 
treatment come from the ability of the requesting and 
disclosing facilities to exchange records electronically.  
However, the MHRA does not require interoperable technology; 
it only changes the consent process to allow for an RLS.  It 
would be perfectly plausible to integrate the technology 
envisioned in the MDH’s description with the consent process 
of the prior law and without an RLS.  Under such a system, 
Doctor A would still find Patient X’s records from Patient X’s 
description (not an RLS) and Patient X would sign a consent 
form for access to those records.  Instead of faxing a consent 
form to the disclosing facility, Doctor A could send the form to 
that facility electronically.  The disclosing facility would still 
inspect the form for validity as it did under prior law.  Upon 
finding the consent form valid, the disclosing facility would 
                                                          
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
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send Doctor A the requested records electronically.  Thus, 
Patient X’s records could be reviewed by Doctor A at the initial 
appointment.  Both the modified prior consent process and the 
envisioned MHRA process would yield health benefits from 
technology that is not yet widely implemented. 
The MHRA consent process with current technology will 
not yield the health benefits associated with EHRs.  Under the 
MHRA, Doctor A learns from Patient X that there may be 
records at another facility.  Patient X signs a consent form 
granting Doctor A access to the RLS.  Doctor A locates records 
in the RLS and then requests that Patient X sign another 
consent form for the release of the specific records Doctor A 
needs.  Patient X signs that consent form.  Doctor A calls the 
facilities holding Patient X’s records and represents that he has 
a valid consent for those records from Patient X.  The facility 
then sends the records over to Doctor A.  However, because 
interoperable technology still has not been implemented, the 
records are likely messengered or mailed to Doctor A.  
Therefore, Patient X still must make a second appointment to 
see Doctor A after the doctor has had a chance to review the 
records.  The MHRA impacts the process described above only 
up to the point of Patient X’s signature on the second consent.  
The actual exchange of electronic records that is envisioned 
after that point is a possibility, but not a reality in Minnesota 
because the necessary interoperable technology has not been 
designed or implemented. 
1. The Prior Consent Law Did Need To Be Revised 
Although the prior consent law was not an actual barrier to 
EHR development, it did need revision because it was a 
perceived barrier and because it was silent as to the rules for 
electronic exchange.  The electronic exchange of records was 
not taken into consideration when the previous law was 
drafted.80  Therefore, the law did not discuss consent issues 
surrounding electronic exchange.  Because the previous law 
was silent, there was a larger potential for abuse of electronic 
exchange where entities could act without any regulation.  For 
example, nothing in the previous law would have prevented the 
                                                          
 80. See Solutions Report, supra note 2, at 3 (“[T]he patient consent 
requirements were designed for paper-based exchanges of information and 
early electronic data base systems that are not conducive to real-time, 
automated electronic exchange of information.”). 
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development of an RLS.  The law prohibited the disclosure of 
health records without patient consent.  However, an RLS is an 
index that simply lists patients’ names and the clinics where 
their records reside.  That information was not part of the 
health record and, thus, could have been collected regardless of 
the law.81 
Requiring patient consent to access information in an RLS 
(or another electronic database) instead of requiring consent for 
data collection was another necessary development.  There are 
at least four increasingly complex models outlining how 
electronic exchange could work.82  Each of these models 
requires either that EHRs be centrally collected or at least be 
centrally searchable.83  Requiring consent from patients to 
include their records in the system would probably be so time-
consuming that the 2015 state mandate for interoperable 
records would be difficult to meet.84  However, requiring 
consent only to access the information still protects patient 
information while allowing development to move forward.  
Although this mechanism was unnecessary for an RLS because 
the RLS does not contain health records, the “opt-out” concept 
is important for the development and collection of EHRs.85 
In sum, the previous law was not a structural barrier to 
the development of EHRs; however, it was necessary to revise 
the law in some way to resolve disagreement between providers 
over the consent process and to resolve the perception that it 
was a barrier.  Furthermore, it is preferable for the state to 
better ensure privacy protection by developing a consent 
process for EHRs that discourages abuse rather than to remain 
                                                          
 81. Interestingly, the previous law did not define health records, so 
whether the RLS would have been legal may have depended upon whether or 
not the patient’s name is considered part of the health record (although it 
would not be considered part of a health record under HIPAA or the new 
MHRA). See HEALTH INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY COLLABORATION 
NATIONAL MEETING, REFORM STATE LAWS RELATED TO THE PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY OF HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Nov. 2007), available at  
http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-health/mpsp/healthrecordsact2007.pdf for a 
document comparing the old and new law comparing old and new laws. 
 82. MINNESOTA PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROJECT LEGAL WORK GROUP, 
CURRENT AND EMERGING MODELS OF HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: 
POTENTIAL PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND LEGAL ISSUES (2006), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/e-health/mpsp/legwg/potlegissues071106.pdf. 
 83. See id. 
 84. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6. 
 85. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
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silent and allow EHR systems to develop unregulated. 
B. PUBLIC HEALTH NEEDS WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN THE 
MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS ACT 
There are two potential public health benefits related to 
EHRs that the MHRA could have developed.  First, EHRs could 
be used for disaster planning and relief during patient 
relocation.86  If the MHRA had required the RLS to be able to 
access the actual EHRs, this public health benefit could have 
been met.  The RLS is not currently available for this use 
because it is limited to being solely an index of the records’ 
physical location, although it could be developed to allow this 
use.  Second, the RLS could serve a public health function for 
emergency treatment if it allowed access to a complete list of a 
patient’s records.  However, because the law envisions multiple 
RLSs, the public health benefits of the RLS are greatly 
reduced.  Even if a patient’s records were indexed in one RLS, 
they may not be indexed or may be only partially indexed in the 
particular RLS to which the provider has access.  Furthermore, 
without the ability to directly access the actual records 
electronically, the RLS may not reduce the time it takes to 
access the needed records once they have been located. 
The other large public health need for EHRs is related to 
research.87  The MHRA did not, and was not intended to, create 
a public health database that would allow researchers to access 
de-identified aggregate data.  Again the RLS could develop into 
a system that allows such research but the MHRA did not 
envision it.  Ultimately, public health uses of EHRs were not 
considered under the MHRA. 
Individual privacy protection was considered by the 
drafters of the MHRA, at least insofar as individuals can 
consent to record disclosure.  However, public health privacy 
protections require a broader privacy policy that encompasses 
data security and control over use of information.  Public health 
should be particularly concerned with policies regarding 
appropriate information use because of the potential for data 
misuse to have broad social consequences.  The MHRA does not 
discuss appropriate data use at all.  While it clearly outlaws 
dissemination of records, it places no limits on providers’ access 
                                                          
 86. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 87. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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to the RLS index once a patient consents to it.  Notably, the 
MHRA does not limit providers’ access to the RLS for 
treatment purposes.  Arguably, the administrative and 
marketing arm of a provider network (which would still be a 
“provider” under the statute) could access the RLS once consent 
is given and mine the index for data about patient traffic 
between the provider and its competitors.  There is no law or 
policy allowing, disallowing, or regulating this kind of data use. 
For some particular public health endeavors, such as 
mental health, drug treatment, and family planning, 
confidentiality is especially important.  Patients who do not feel 
that these records are kept confidential may not seek treatment 
at all.88  The MHRA does not allow patients to shield specific 
providers they have visited from the RLS.  Thus, patients have 
the choice to either participate fully in the RLS or not 
participate at all.  Patients who wish to keep certain visits 
confidential will either choose to not participate in the RLS 
(which has one set of undesirable public health consequences) 
or will choose not to seek treatment (which can also have 
adverse public health consequences).  Ultimately this dilemma 
is untenable for public health.  If the MHRA had considered 
these problems it could have required the RLS to allow 
individuals to selectively shield specific information from it.  
That policy would have respected the individual’s autonomy 
and right to control access to their records while also avoiding 
the potential repercussions explained above. 
                                                          
 88. There may be state consent laws related to these particularly sensitive 
areas that prevent the inclusion of these records in the RLS, but specific 
exclusions are not contemplated by the MHRS. See e.g. Mental Health: A 
Report from the Surgeon General, 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter1/sec1.html#appr
oach (last visited Dec. 11, 2008)(discussing the stigma associated with mental 
illness, and the impact that stigma has on seeking treatment).  The logical 
conclusion is publicizing and individual’s treatment may make him or her less 
likely to seek it to begin with.  Similar arguments can be made for both drug 
treatment and family planning decisions.  See e.g. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Services, Alcohol and Drug Information, 
http://ncadi.samhsa.gov/govpubs/bkd107/2f17.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2008) 
(noting that one impact of required reporting laws is that women may forego 
care). 
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C. THE MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS ACT DOES NOT BALANCE 
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY WITH ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD 
DEVELOPMENT 
The MHRA does not balance individual privacy with EHR 
development because the law neither inhibits nor encourages 
EHR development.  The MHRA itself does not create an EHR 
system.  The real benefit of instant access to EHRs will come 
when health records are actually exchanged electronically.  
Neither electronic transmission of consent nor electronic 
disclosure of records is required by the MHRA, and the 
technologies needed to complete these steps have not yet been 
implemented.  Thus, the MHRA does not create an EHR 
system. 
Furthermore, the electronic provisions in the MHRA are 
specifically tailored to the development of an RLS, which may 
or may not be useful in the ultimate EHR system.  The RLS 
could develop into a system that allows a physician, with the 
proper consent, to access records at another facility 
electronically.  But it is equally likely that the state will 
develop a different infrastructure where the RLS is irrelevant 
to the electronic exchange of information.  The concept is 
further confused by the fact that the MDH intends for there to 
be multiple RLSs.89  Consequently, even if an RLS is useful for 
one HIE, a broader RLS would have to be created to search all 
of the other RLSs before this approach would work as a 
statewide system. 
The MHRA is concerned with individual privacy, but the 
law neither strengthens nor weakens privacy protections as 
compared to the prior consent law.  The fact that an individual 
cannot shield specific information from the RLS is a glaring 
privacy problem.  However, the MHRA requires the patient to 
consent twice to providers’ access to records before a physician 
can view them, whereas the previous law required the patient’s 
consent only once.90  This added consent requirement may 
provide more privacy protection even as it slows down a 
provider’s access to patient records.  It is impossible to assess 
whether the MHRA will provide sufficient privacy protection in 
an EHR system because the other components of a privacy 
policy, data security and information use, have not yet been 
                                                          
 89. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 6. 
 90. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
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developed.  The MDH might argue that the MHRA is one small 
piece of a much larger EHR and privacy picture and that this 
law, while not directly creating EHRs, removes at least one 
barrier to development.  The problem is that the rest of the 
picture is still so vague and unknown that it is difficult to know 
whether this law will be congruent with the entire scheme or 
will need another revision. 
D. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS 
ACT SHOULD BE AMENDED 
1. The Record Locator Service 
The RLS provisions have two significant problems.  First, 
the RLS does not allow individuals to shield specific 
information and, second, the MHRA allows multiple RLSs to 
develop.  Privacy advocates objected to the RLS, testifying that 
even without medical records, the RLS may expose significant 
patient information to a large number of people.91  The term 
“provider” is not limited to a care giver but may extend to the 
administrative arm of a hospital or clinic.92  Therefore 
individuals that are not caregivers may be accessing the 
information in the RLS.  Also, the RLS may reveal significant 
medical information simply by listing the clinic or physician 
that the patient visited.  For example, if the RLS lists that 
records are located at Planned Parenthood, the individual 
accessing the RLS may draw conclusions about the patient’s 
sexual activity or family planning decisions.  A policy that both 
allows patients to remove specific information about 
themselves from the RLS and controls how RLS information 
can be used would limit this privacy threat. 
Privacy advocates further argued that a physician might 
learn information about a patient that are not related to the 
physician’s treatment of that patient.93  The patient may not 
understand the implications of withholding certain information 
from the RLS.  For example, a patient may think that a dentist 
does not need to know about the patient’s cancer history 
because the dentist is only treating the teeth.  A dentist might 
                                                          
 91. See, e.g., Mar. 13, 2007 hearing, supra note 47. 
 92. See MINN. STAT. § 144.291, subdiv. 2(h) (Supp. 2007)(the definition 
explicitly includes a licensed health care facility, which could have many non-
licensed professionals accessing information for administrative reasons). 
 93. See sources cited supra notes 38–39. 
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examine a patient more carefully or change prescriptions or 
treatment plans if the dentist knows that the patient is also 
being treated for cancer.  Furthermore, a physician is 
prohibited from disclosing medical information in the RLS 
without consent by both the MHRA and the state licensing 
standards.94  Nevertheless, the patient should have ultimate 
control over any disclosure of her medical records.  Yet the 
system, as it is currently envisioned, limits the patient’s choice 
to either opting entirely in or entirely out of the RLSs. 
The fact that the MHRA allows for multiple RLSs to be 
developed seriously limits the utility of the system because a 
patient’s records might be indexed in several RLSs and there is 
no provision for a single master index covering all RLSs.  
Further, because these RLSs are owned and operated by an 
HIE, they will be funded by the health care entities in the HIE.  
Presumably, charges to the patient will ultimately fund the 
operation of an RLS.  Given that there will be many RLSs and 
a hospital might have to belong to many of them to get a 
complete picture of its patients’ records, these costs will be 
driven up unnecessarily.  A cleaner solution is simply to create 
a central RLS. 
2. Representation of Consent 
Privacy advocates objected to the representation of consent 
because they felt that made it too easy for an individual to lie 
in order to access records.  In other words, insurers or 
employers could simply present themselves as a provider with 
consent and have records released to them.  This argument is 
weak because even without the concept of representation, an 
individual interested in obtaining medical records can 
manufacture a paper consent and fax it to a physician.  
Basically, an individual intent on stealing specific records can 
lie and do so regardless of the consent process. 
Two electronic solutions were suggested at the hearings: 
(1) using electronic signatures or (2) using electronic pads 
similar to those used at grocery stores for credit card 
validation.95  It is unclear why neither of these options was 
adopted in the final bill, and the MDH did not offer a reason at 
the hearings.  There are three advantages to these solutions: 
                                                          
 94. MINN. STAT. § 147.091, subdivs. 1(o, m) (Supp. 2007). 
 95. May 1, 2007 hearing, supra note 7. 
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(1) they would eliminate the need for providers to keep paper 
consent forms; (2) they would remove the perception that the 
MHRA weakens patient privacy protection in order to promote 
EHR development; and (3) they would strengthen privacy 
protection because a “bad actor” would have to hack into a 
closed system, manufacture the signature, and relay it to the 
disclosing computer system.  Currently, a “bad actor” would 
have to print the universal consent form from the MDH 
webpage, forge a patient’s signature on it, and fax it to the 
disclosing office.  This approach requires much less expertise 
than hacking into a sophisticated and secure database system. 
The representation of consent is an unsatisfactory device to 
promote information exchange because it increases the 
perception that patient consent is weakened while, at the same 
time, it fails to provide the greater security protections 
inherent in an electronic consent process.  An electronic 
consent process should be developed and implemented and the 
representation of consent repealed. 
E. THE MINNESOTA HEALTH RECORDS ACT AS PART OF A BROAD 
PRIVACY POLICY 
From a public health perspective, the MHRA does not 
provide a satisfactory privacy policy for EHRs.  Such a policy 
should include consent, data security requirements, and 
controls over information use.  Regulations in each of these 
three areas must be coordinated with one another because the 
requirements of one section may affect the requirements of the 
others.  The MHRA deals only with the consent issue, not with 
the other two areas of concern.  It is likely that the MHRA will 
have to be revised again when those areas have been developed 
and when it becomes clear whether the RLS will be part of 
Minnesota’s EHR system. 
In one significant way, the MHRA may actually inhibit 
further privacy policy development.  The RLS is run by private 
non-governmental entities that make money operating it.  
These RLSs will now be stakeholders in any further EHR 
development and will have an interest in maintaining the RLS 
whether or not the RLS is a logical electronic component for the 
EHR system.  Furthermore, these stakeholders will probably be 
interested in maintaining private development of the electronic 
infrastructure which could block the government from 
developing a universal system that would promote public 
BOMASH.WEB 2/20/2009  10:59:31 AM 




In sum, the MHRA should be amended to allow individuals 
to shield specific information from the RLS, to create one 
central RLS rather than allowing for the development of 
multiple RSLs, and to develop an electronic consent process to 
replace the representation of consent.  Finally, the MHRA may 
have to be further altered as regulations for data security 
standards and control over data use are developed.  Without 
those pieces, it is impossible to know whether the RLS consent 
requirements provide sufficient privacy protection for EHRs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The benefits of EHRs for efficiency in treatment alone are 
great enough that health care companies will continue to move 
away from paper records.  The benefits in individual care and 
public health are of a great enough social benefit to justify a 
public policy supporting a shift to EHRs.  Patient privacy 
protection is integral to the public health benefits of EHRs 
because, without it, data collected through EHR networks may 
be unreliable.  Furthermore, the ease with which entire bodies 
of electronic records can be disseminated en masse and the 
ability to mine that data in unforeseen ways poses a heightened 
threat to individual privacy if the data were used 
inappropriately.  Patient consent to dissemination of records 
may produce unintended and possibly adverse consequences in 
large part because we cannot yet foresee the entire impact of 
EHRs on individual health care and public health.  Therefore, 
patient consent, while still a necessary component of privacy 
protection in an electronic era, is not a sufficient protection by 
itself. 
Public health agencies should advocate for privacy policies 
that will adequately protect patients because a lack of 
regulation will allow for information misuse to occur.  To 
adequately protect privacy, laws supporting EHR technology 
need to include regulations covering at least the following 
areas: (1) patient consent to the release of medical records; (2) 
state-of-the-art data security for electronic systems; and (3) 
acceptable data use, including any sale of information that is 
illegally obtained from the EHR system.  Regulations in all 
three areas need to be developed simultaneously because it is 
difficult to know how to adequately regulate one area without 
some sense of how the other two areas will be handled.  For 
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example, it is difficult to develop a patient consent law without 
knowing what the data security requirements will be, for the 
data security may impact both the kind of patient consent 
required and the point at which the patient should give it. 
The MHRA was portrayed in the media as a major step 
toward the development of EHR technology in Minnesota.  The 
e-health committee publications maintained that the MHRA 
strengthened rather than weakened privacy protection.  The 
MHRA does not necessarily move Minnesota towards e-health.  
The electronic innovations in the law are limited to an RLS 
that is only an electronic index of the physical locations of 
records.  That index could be used in the final EHR system, but 
it is equally likely that it will not be.  As an individual privacy 
policy, the MHRA is neither more nor less protective of 
individual privacy than the prior law was, nor is it more or less 
burdensome.  The MHRA requires two consent forms instead of 
one to access records, but as it will be used today a patient may 
still have to make a separate appointment to be treated on the 
basis of outside records.  The MHRA simply creates a different 
consent process than the prior consent law did.  The MHRA 
should, however, be amended in at least three ways: 1) to allow 
individuals to shield specific information from the RLS, 2) to 
require the creation of one central RLS, and 3) to replace the 
representation of consent with an electronic consent process.  
These changes would strengthen privacy protections and better 
meet public health purposes. 
As a public health privacy policy, the MHRA is not 
sufficient.  The MHRA focuses narrowly on the patient consent 
process for records disclosure, and thus only deals with one of 
the three interdependent public health privacy components.  
Because the other two components, data security standards 
and data use, are not yet developed, it is impossible to 
determine whether the MHRA will provide a sufficient consent 
process for the future electronic health record system.  It is 
likely that the MHRA will be revised again once EHRs have 
been more fully developed. 
 
